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Non-Technical Summary:
The choice of the most appropriate policy instrument to address environmental problems
has been extensively debated by economists. Two broad approaches are usually distinguished:
the incentive-based or price approach - which comprises policy instruments such as abatement
subsidies and effluent charges - and the command-and-control or quantity  approach - which
comprises instruments such as processing  standards and emission quotas and permits.
Traditionally, this debate has focused on a closed-economy framework, where it has been argued
that on economic efficiency grounds price instruments are superior to quantity instruments. Once
the presence of trade flows and the possible use of trade-restricting policies are considered,
however, the traditional ranking of environmental policy instruments may be altered.
This paper uses an applied general equilibrium model to compare the performance of
different environmental policy instruments for CO2 emission reductions in an open-economy
framework where countries might use trade restrictions as well as environmental restrictions in a
strategic way. Countries are grouped in two blocs: OECD and non-OECD members. They can
establish agreements on CO2 emission reduction either within a single bloc or - provided that
each bloc has agreed a common position - between blocs. We also take account of the developed
countries' higher valuation of CO2 emission reduction and the special nature of these emission -
they deteriorate not only the environment of the emitting country but the global environment as
well - a characteristic which gives rise to international free-riding in emission abatement. These
features result in a higher degree of internalisation in the OECD bloc, and a strong tendency by
non-OECD countries to free-ride. Consequently, an inter-bloc carbon treaty guaranteeing full
internalisation of environmental emissions is mostly beneficial to OECD countries, and would
only appeal to the South unless the North gives them some form of compensation in exchange.
Using this model, we find that if countries are unable to establish an agreement on
emission reductions - either at a regional or inter-regional level - and can use trade-restrictive
policies, each instrument's degree of correction (internalisation) of the environmental problem is
very small, particularly for non-OECD members. When an intra-bloc agreement is implemented
and countries are still able to use trade policy instruments, the degree of internalisation increases
substantially, especially in the OECD bloc. In this scenario, the performance difference between
emission quotas and taxes, in terms of their effects on global economic welfare is now
significant and favourable to the former. The reason for this is that emission quotas lead to
significantly lower levels of import tariffs, because they make export supply responses to
changes in world commodity prices less elastic, and hence result in a less aggressive trade policy
stance.
When countries cannot make use of trade policy instruments, the pattern of results
described above remains basically unaltered. In this case, however, the degree of internalisation
is much higher since, with direct instruments of trade policy being unavailable, countries use
environmental policies as a substitute for trade policies in order to restrict imports.  On the other
hand, when trade policy instruments are not available and an intra or inter-bloc emission
reduction agreement is in force, the difference in performance between emission quotas and
taxes becomes very small but still favourable to a quota regime.
In conclusion, although in a closed-economy setting carbon taxes may be viewed as
being superior to quotas or permits on efficiency grounds, when trade linkages and strategic
trade responses are accounted for, the use of emission quotas, by promoting trade liberalization,
could be preferable as a means of supporting a regional or global carbon treaty.
1 Introduction
This paper develops a calibrated model of North-South trade with carbon emissions
to compare the implications of dierent domestic instruments for achieving CO2 emis-
sions reductions in a strategic setting where economies are linked by trade ows.
The question of whether or not dierent instruments of environmental protection
are equivalent has long occupied a central role in environmental economics. The liter-
ature usually distinguishes two broad approaches to address environmental problems:
the incentive-based (or price) approach and the command-and-control (or quantity)
approach. Associated with each there is a whole range of policy instruments such
as subsidies, emission taxes and euent charges, on the one hand, and standards,
quotas and emission permits, on the other (see, e.g., Baumol and Oates, 1975).
In a non-strategic, non-stochastic, full-information environment, incentive-based and
command-and-control instruments are in principle equivalent (Weitzman, 1974; Adar
and Grin, 1976; Spulber, 1985), although dierences may exist between the two in
terms of ease of administration.
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Once uncertainty is introduced, however, there is
generally no longer an equivalence between fee-based and quantity-based instruments
(Fishelson, 1976; Weitzman, 1974). If marginal valuation and marginal abatement
cost schedules are not observable, incentive-based instruments can be more ecient
in that they can achieve a given standard at a lower social cost (Baumol and Oates,
1971; Baumol, 1972; Schultze, 1977). On the other hand, in situations where rms
have a high degree of market power, or where the need to act is particularly urgent,
command-and-control instruments can be more eective (Baumol and Oates, 1975).
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It has been argued that incentive-based instruments may be in some cases easier to administer
(Baumol and Oates, 1975). In other cases, however, certain quantity-based instruments, notably
tradeable emission permits, may have practical advantages over their incentive-based counterparts,
oering greater control over the level of emissions both in a static and in a dynamic framework
(Oates, 1994).
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In spite of these considerations, policy makers|especially in North America|have
shown a preference for command-and-control instruments in implementing environ-
mental standards (Oates, 1986). Some literature has been devoted to explaining this
preference from a political economy perspective (see, e.g., Buchanan, 1975; Mestel-
man, 1989).
Another reason why quantity and price based instruments may be non-equivalent
is their dierential impact on strategic trade policy interaction in an open economy
framework: the responsiveness of supply decisions to trade policy changes is aected
by the presence of environmental policies, and this eect is not the same for quan-
tity and price based instruments. This may result in dierent non-cooperative trade
policy outcomes, and, if environmental policies are used as substitutes for trade poli-
cies, in dierent levels of internalization. The non-equivalence between quantity and
price based instruments in strategic contexts has been extensively analyzed both in
the industrial organization literature|which has contrasted price and quantity set-
ting behaviour (e.g. Singh and Vives, 1984)|as well as in the international trade
literature|which has compared the implications of import taris and import quotas
under trade policy retaliation (e.g., Rodriguez, 1974)|but not in the environmental
literature.
In this paper we contrast the implications of quantity and fee-based instruments
of environmental protection in a strategic, open-economy, North-South setting. For
this purpose we use a calibrated model of world trade, benchmarked to 1990 data
on trade, consumption and production. Into this we add global environmental ex-
ternality eects from greenhouse emissions. We compute both non-cooperative Nash
equilibria in trade and environmental policies when countries use tax or quota-based
instruments, as well as Nash cooperative solutions where countries in both the North
and the South regions jointly bargain over environmental policies in the presence of
side payments of cash. Results of our numerical simulations allow us to compare non-
cooperative and cooperative equilibria for alternative environmental policy regimes,
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and the associated North-South distribution of welfare gains and losses.
A recent paper which has introduced both international and strategic dimensions
in environmental policy analysis is Copeland and Taylor (1995). In their model
countries independently choose optimal emission quotas, which are implemented via
tradeable permits. The authors use this setting to examine the impact of exogenous
trade policy changes on environmental quality and welfare. Our analysis diers from
theirs in several respects. First, our focus is the comparison of quantity and price-
based environmental policy instruments. Second, we add a strategic dimension also
to trade policy. Finally, we also examine cooperative outcomes.
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There has been considerable discussion in recent years about the institution of
policies to respond to global climate change, a discussion frequently characterized by
a strong North-South connotation. This reects developed and developing countries'
dierent views and priorities over global environmental management. Industrialized
countries have argued that, because of the global nature of greenhouse emissions, both
developed and developing countries should be expected to clean up, and that failure
by developing countries to comply should be penalized through the imposition of trade
restrictions.
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Developing countries have objected that instituting more stringent en-
vironmental policies would slow down their economic growth, which could be both
unequitable|since industrial countries have had an opportunity to develop without
any environment-related constraints|and possibly dynamically inecient|in consid-
2
Nordhaus and Yang (1997) examine market, cooperative and non-cooperative environmental
strategies in a multi-region dynamic general-equilibrium setting. They compute non-cooperative
Nash equilibria in environmental policies as well as cooperative equilibria where countries adopt
globally ecient policies to reduce emissions. In their model, however, neither bargaining solutions
nor interactions between trade and environmental policies are considered.
3
In this respect, there have been formal proposals for trade sanctions provisions to be incorporated
in international environmental agreements as a means of disciplining free-riders (see Uimonen and
Whalley, 1997).
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eration of the apparent \U-shaped" relationship between environmental quality and
per capita income (Grossman, 1995).
4
The developing countries' position is thus that
they should be either exempted from taking part in any substantive international en-
vironmental agreement or nancially compensated (see Uimonen and Whalley, 1997;
Whalley, 1997).
5
Although developed countries have shown some openness towards
the idea of compensation, given the signicance of the resource transfer involved
(see Uimonen and Whalley, 1997), the compensation approach has eventually been
rejected in favour of an \exclusion" approach in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.
Even if these developments seem to point to an abandonment of the idea of for-
mally sanctioning the use of trade measures as an enforcement mechanism, inter-
action between countries in trade policies still remains, implying that the eects of
any environmental policy cooperation arrangement should be evaluated against the
backdrop of strategic trade policy interaction. The debate on the North-South dimen-
sions of global environmental issues usually abstract from which form of instruments
should be used to achieve a given emission reduction target; but, as we have pointed
out above, in a strategic open-economy setting the choice of instrument can aect
non-cooperative trade policy outcomes, and hence the size and the international dis-
tribution of the gains from internalization. And since trade retaliation represents the
\threat point" for bargaining, distributional outcomes under trade cooperation could
also be aected.
Indeed, results of our numerical simulations show that, under free trade, dier-
4
The GATT (1992) itself has come close to endorsing at least a version of this argument when
maintaining that growth could go hand-in-hand with higher environmental quality if additional
income is spent on environmental protection. See also Whalley (1997).
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An alternative way (to direct cash transfers) of implementing compensation for developing coun-
tries is the redistribution of tax revenue (or quota rents) on the basis of population (see Whalley
and Wigle, 1991).
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ent instruments of CO2 emissions reduction are not equivalent; specically, emission
quotas (or equivalently country-specic permits) can lead to higher levels of inter-
nalization in a non-cooperative equilibrium than emission taxes do. The dierence,
however, is not very pronounced, which is simply a symptom of the weak linkage
between carbon emissions and tradeables production as evidenced by production and
trade data. We also nd that if taris are endogenized, countries cease to use en-
vironmental policy instruments as substitutes for trade polices, but the choice of
domestic environmental instruments does nevertheless aect non-cooperative taris
levels, with carbon quotas leading to lower trade barriers than emission charges do.
With reference to negotiated outcomes, when taris are endogenous and negotiations
are restricted to environmental policies only, large trade barriers still remain. In this
case, we also nd that emission quotas lead to lower non-cooperative taris; and in
a global environmental treaty with side payments of cash, the bargaining outcome
is considerably more favourable to the South region if the treaty is supported by
emission taxes rather than by emission quotas.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
presents a brief discussion of the implications of trade-environment linkages for non-
cooperative and cooperative policy responses. Section 4 describes the data used for
parameter calibration. Section 5 presents our numerical simulations and analyzes
results. Section 6 summarizes our ndings and concludes.
2 A Two-Region Model of North-South Trade with Carbon
Emissions
We assume two regions in the model, A and B, each respectively including N
A
and
N
B
identical countries; we take region A as representing the North and region B
the South. This North-South categorization is meant to reect broad dierences in
technologies and preferences, while at the same time maintaining the dimensionality
of the model at a minimum.
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There are two goods produced in each region, a tradeable good X, a non-tradeable
good Y , and two factors, value added V , and energy, E. Consumers in each country
view the tradeables produced domestically and abroad as imperfect substitutes, and
consume both domestic and imported varieties, together with non-tradeables and
environmental quality. The latter is aected by the global emissions associated with
the use of energy in production.
Preferences for domestic goods and imports in each country are represented via a
three-level nested Cobb-Douglas/CES aggregation of the form
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where D
A
X
, D
A
Y
, D
B
X
, D
B
Y
are domestic consumption levels for domestically produced
goods and M
A
A
, M
A
B
, M
B
B
, M
B
A
are imports; 
A
and 
B
are share parameters for
non-tradeables demand; 
A
and 
B
are share parameters relating to the share of
same-region tradeables in total tradeables demand; 
A
and 
B
refer to the share of
domestic goods in total same-region tradeables demand; 
A
and 
B
are elasticities of
substitution between same region tradeables and tradeables produced in the other re-
gion; and  is the elasticity of substitution between domestically produced tradeables
and same-region tradeables.
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Preferences for consumption goods and global environmental quality, Q, are mod-
elled through a Cobb-Douglas utility function:
U
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A
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U
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)  Q
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B
(H
B
)
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B
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where 
A
and 
B
represent the shares of environmental quality in utility. Note that
for this specication the marginal valuation for environmental quality is proportional
to (non-expanded) income.
The endowment of value added is constant in each region and respectively equal
to G
A
and G
B
. Value added can be transformed into energy at a constant marginal
rate of transformation, which, without loss of generality, we assume to be equal to
unity. Thus, net-of-tax prices of value added and energy are the same within each
region, and are denoted respectively as p
A
and p
B
. Each unit of energy employed in
production generates an amount  of global carbon emissions. If there are emission
charges 
A
and 
B
in each region, we can express the gross-of-tax price of energy
inputs as
p
A
E
= p
A
+ 
A
; (5)
p
B
E
= p
B
+ 
B
: (6)
In the rest of our model description in this section we shall restrict our attention to
emission charges, and later discuss the modelling of quantity based instruments.
Value added and energy are both used as inputs in the production of tradeables
and non-tradeables, through constant-returns-to-scale technologies. Thus, domestic
prices of domestically produced goods are equal to unit costs:
p
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X
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A
E
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p
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A
E
); (8)
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For given output levels S
A
X
, S
A
Y
, S
B
X
, S
B
Y
, we can write aggregate domestic demands
for energy (using Shephard's Lemma) as
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For given energy demand levels, environmental quality is then
Q =

Q  (N
A
D
A
E
+N
B
D
B
E
); (13)
where

Q denotes the initial endowment of global environmental quality (before emis-
sions).
Each country in each region levies ad valorem import taris at rates t
A
A
, t
A
B
, t
B
B
, t
B
A
,
where subscripts refer to the region where the trade ow originates, and superscripts
refer to the importing region (where taris are levied). Thus, t
A
A
and t
B
B
are rates
of taris levied on intra-regional trade ows, whereas t
A
B
and t
B
A
apply to external
trade ows. The gross-of-tari prices of imported tradeables in A and B become
respectively
q
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= (1 + t
A
A
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q
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; (15)
q
B
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B
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q
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A
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X
: (17)
Consumers are assumed to behave as quantity takers with respect to the level of global
environmental quality. Then, for given preferences, a given level of environmental
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qualityQ, commodity prices, p
A
X
; p
B
X
; p
A
Y
; p
B
Y
; q
A
A
; q
A
B
; q
B
B
; q
B
A
, and expanded incomes, I
A
,
I
B
, utility maximization yields uncompensated demands for domestic goods, D
A
X
, D
A
Y
,
D
B
X
, D
B
Y
, and uncompensated import demands, M
A
A
, M
A
B
, M
B
B
, M
B
A
. The marginal
valuation for environmental quality in each country, v
A
, v
B
, is also a function of the
same variables.
Expanded income in each region can be written as the value of resource endow-
ments, plus tari revenue, plus carbon tax revenue, plus the (shadow) value of en-
vironmental quality (note that the latter is a function of income itself, which makes
the denition of I implicit):
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Market clearing requires
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The reason for using expanded income to derive consumer demand is that we model damage as
a reduction in environmental quality, i.e. a good rather than as an economic \bad." To illustrate
by reference to a dierent context, this is analogous to modelling labour supply by having leisure
(the dierence between time endowments and labour supply) entering as an argument (a good) of
the utility function, instead of having labour supply entering directly as a bad. If we model labour
supply in this way, then leisure also needs to be included in expanded income to derive consumer
choices. The two specications are fully equivalent.
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Governments in each country are assumed to choose policies so as to maximize the
utility of the representative consumers in their respective countries, given the policies
chosen by other countries, the general equilibrium condition described above, and the
constraints on policy choices implied by any international coordination agreements
that may apply. A non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is then a conguration of policies
such that the policy chosen by each country is a best response to the policies chosen
by all other countries.
In the numerical implementation of the model, functional forms are specied
as follows. Unit cost functions for tradeables and non-tradeables production are a
Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution (CES) aggregation of energy and non-energy in-
put prices:
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where  is the elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy inputs, and
the s are energy share parameters.
The above specication exploits symmetry across countries within regions to rep-
resent a situation where all countries within a region adopt identical trade and envi-
ronmental policies. In our calculation of non-cooperative equilibria, however, we need
to examine unilateral deviations in policy by individual countries in a region. For this
purpose we need to distinguish a representative country in each region and distin-
guish its tari and tax rates, output levels and prices form those of other countries
belonging to the same bloc.
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3 Strategic Implications of Trade-Environment Linkages
In what follows, we discuss some possible implications of trade-environment policy
linkages|drawing on earlier literature and using the analytical structure we have
just described as our frame of reference|to contrast eects of fee and quota-based
instruments for non-cooperative policy outcomes.
A central proposition in the theoretical trade and environment literature is that, if
tradeables production and environmental emissions are linked, countries would tend
to use environmental policies as second-best substitutes for trade policies in order to
manipulate terms of trade in their favour (Bhagwati, 1971; Markusen, 1975; Ludema
and Wooton, 1994). Countries which are net importers of pollution intensive goods
will have an incentive to under-internalize the externalities to simulate an import
tari, whereas exporters of pollution intensive goods will have an incentive to over-
internalize to simulate an export tax. This eect is also present in our setting, with the
strength of the linkage between emissions and trade depending on how concentrated
emissions are in the exporting sector, as well as on abatement possibilities in that
sector and on the level of domestic consumption for the exported good. If emissions
only originate in the exporting sector and if there are no direct abatement possibilities
(apart from reducing output), and if all the production of the sector is exported, then
an emission tax will be fully equivalent to an export tax, and will thus represent
a rst-best instrument (from the point of view of a large exporting country) for
aecting its terms of trade. If the exported good is also domestically consumed,
then an emission tax will be equivalent to a production tax on the exporting sector,
and its eectiveness as a commercial policy instrument will be accordingly reduced.
Furthermore, if emissions are not limited to the exporting sector, or if there exist
signicant abatement possibilities within sectors, then the trade policy-environmental
policy linkage is signicantly weakened, and there is less scope for using environmental
policies as a substitute for trade polices.
How this policy linkage aects welfare depends on its very strength. In the pres-
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ence of a global externality, such as global warming, free-riding by individual countries
would in itself leads to under-internalization. If trade-environmental policy linkages
are not too strong, then the use of environmental policies as second-best trade policy
instruments can help sustain higher rates of internalization. If, however, the linkage
is strong, it could lead to the externality being overcorrected|a point also noted by
Ludema and Wooton.
To the extent that environmental policies can be used as substitutes for trade poli-
cies in an open economy setting, emission charges and emission quotas or permits will
have dierent implications for non-cooperative outcomes|much as taris and quo-
tas do (Rodriguez, 1974)|owing to the dierent way in which they aect individual
countries' optimal responses. On theoretical grounds, there would be a presumption
that an emission quota would lead to higher a level of internalization than a tax-
based instrument; this is because the imposition of an emission limit in a country
makes its import demand for emission-intensive goods more inelastic in comparison
with an emission charge. Under an emission tax, a rise in the price of imports can
lead to substitution towards domestic production, whereas under an emission limit
such substitution is not possible. Consequently, the optimal export tax|which, as
discussed earlier, is implicit in the use of environmental instruments|is higher under
an emission target than under an emission tax; accordingly, internalization levels in
a non-cooperative equilibrium will be higher under a quantity based instrument.
Whether this dierence between the eects of quantity and tax-based instrument
in a strategic setting will lead to a more or less ecient non-cooperative outcome,
again depends on the strength of the linkage discussed above. If this linkage is su-
ciently strong and non-cooperative equilibria feature over-internalization, then emis-
sion targets will be worse, on eciency grounds, than emission taxes; but in an
under-internalization regime, emission quotas will be superior to a tax.
When direct trade policy instruments such as taris are available to trading part-
ners, environmental policies will cease to be the tool of choice for achieving trade
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policy objectives, which implies that non-cooperative rates of internalization will be
lower. Nevertheless, the presence of emission taxes or quotas will aect the tari
retaliation outcome; and, since taxes and quotas aect trade responses dierently,
they will have dierent impacts on non-cooperative tari levels. Even when coun-
tries cooperate in environmental policies, emission taxes and quotas can still have
dierent eects on trade retaliation. If environmental emissions are closely linked to
output levels, environmental cooperation supported by emission targets will tend to
dampen producer supply responses; in turn, this will narrow the scope for an aggres-
sive trade policy stance, leading to lower non-cooperative taris. This dampening
eect, however, would not be present under emission taxation.
Asymmetries in economic size across countries imply asymmetries in strategic
incentives across policy dimensions: large countries tend to win the trade policy
game|because of their greater market power|and to lose the environmental policy
game|since small countries can more easily free ride on them. This asymmetry in
incentives, in turn, will translate into dierential eects for large and small countries
following a shift from price to quantity based instruments. Specically, since emission
quotas tend to constrain trade retaliation, they will be relatively more favourable to
small countries than to large ones.
In the next two sections, we shall explore these dierences between fee and quota
based instruments, and their underlying mechanisms, by means of numerical simula-
tions using a calibrated version of the model described in Section 2.
4 Data and Parameters
This section briey describes the data used to parameterize the model. Parame-
terization for the trade side is straightforward, but the same cannot be said about
the environment side of the model, due to the lack of suitable data, especially for
parameters having to do with environmental quality and damage.
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The production and trade data used for the trade submodel|as well as the data
on population and number of countries per region|comes from the World Bank's
World Development Report 1992 . To parameterize our two-sector, two-region model
structure, we take the non-traded sector as corresponding to construction and ser-
vices, and the North as coinciding with OECD countries, with the rest of the world
representing the South. Intra-regional and inter-regional trade ows have been ob-
tained from UNCTAD (1992). All trade and production data we use are for the year
1990. As for trade elasticities, we have taken the values used in Perroni and Wigle
(1994). Finally, the value we use for the elasticity of substitution between energy and
non-energy inputs is consistent with estimates which have traditionally been used in
the applied trade literature (see, for instance, Perroni and Wigle, 1994; or Wigle and
Whalley, 1991). The basic data for this part of the model is presented in Table 1.
Parameters for the environmental submodel (Table 2) have been obtained as fol-
lows. Sectoral emission coecients are based on input-output data on energy con-
sumption and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. The input-output data comes from
the OECD (1995), and is based on the 1990 tables of Germany, United Kingdom and
USA. The CO2 emissions data, in turn, was obtained from the OECD (1996). Input-
output data has been used to compute energy consumption coecients by sector. We
have then applied their ratio to total CO2 emissions by OECD members to obtain
emissions by sectors. These are then converted to the model units by multiplying
them by the overall coecient of energy consumption. In order to adjust for the fact
that energy consumption in LDCs is often heavily subsidized, we have used the OECD
energy coecient ratio to compute sectoral emissions for non-OECD countries.
Marginal valuations for environmental quality are derived using a \revealed pref-
erence" argument. From Perroni and Rutherford (1993) we can obtain an estimate
of the required unit carbon tax rate which would be needed to implement current
proposals on CO2 emissions cuts. Assuming these proposals are indicative of an op-
timal policy, we can combine this information with that of total carbon emissions
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Table 1: Trade and Production Data
North South
GDP (billion US$) 15,993.4 6,305.5
Number of countries 24 117
Share parameters
Imports in tradeables demand 0.523 0.247
Non-tradeables in aggregate demand 0.703 0.455
Intra-regional trade in total trade 0.770 0.357
Elasticities
Armington elasticities
Bottom nest 2.5 2.5
Top level 2.5 2.5
Tradeables-nontradeables 1.0 1.0
Energy-nonenergy inputs 1.0 1.0
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Table 2: Parameters for Environment Submodel
North South
Energy shares
Tradeables 0.045 0.067
Non-tradeables 0.009 0.037
Elasticity of marginal valuation
With respect to damage 0.50 0.50
With respect to income 1.00 1.00
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and production (income) to compute the tax that would fully internalize the global
externality associated with CO2 emissions.
To obtain the marginal valuation for each bloc, we have assumed that it is propor-
tional to per capita income, which implies an elasticity of unity with respect to this
variable. The hypothesis that marginal valuation of environmental quality increases
with per capita income has found some empirical support either directly (see Cic-
chetti and Smith, 1973; Desvouges et al., 1987) or indirectly (see Grossman, 1995).
In a survey about the willingness to pay (WTP) for recreation in the Spanish Peaks
Primitive Area (in Montana, USA), Cicchetti and Smith (1973) nd that the revealed
WTP by its users rises by about 0.013 per extra unit of household income. On the
basis of this estimate, and of some others reported in the same study, we select a
value of unity for the elasticity of marginal valuation with respect to income. This
is consistent with evidence for a fairly broad range of household income level (for an
income level of $1,000 the elasticity would be 1.019, while from an income level of
$80,000 it would be 1.0002).
Finally, the value for the elasticity of damage with respect to emissions that we
use is based on Perroni and Wigle (1994). This elasticity value, together with the
marginal valuation, enables us to infer values for the share of environmental quality
in demand and for the implied endowment of global environmental quality.
5 Simulations and Results
The parameterized model is used to numerically simulate non-cooperative and co-
operative policy outcomes. To compute non-cooperative equilibria, we iterate over
calculations of optimal policy responses by representative countries in both region,
subject to a full set of general equilibrium constraints (as set out above) until con-
vergence to a Nash equilibrium is achieved. For this purpose, we model alternative
environmental policy instruments as follows. When emission charges are used, we
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compute optimal responses by a country assuming that the emission charges in other
countries are maintained at a constant level. When computing optimal responses
under emission quotas, emission levels in other countries are held constant, and taxes
are allowed to adjust endogenously so as to meet the given target.
We also compute cooperative bargaining solutions associated with these games
in the presence of side payments of cash, adopting Nash's (1953) axiomatic solution
concept. In computing bargaining solutions, we take the non-cooperative Nash equi-
librium solution utilities as representing the disagreement point, simulate the utilities
possibilities frontier under cooperation, and apply the Nash criterion to the product
of the dierences in region utilities along the frontier and disagreement utilities.
Ten dierent scenarios are examined, both under an emission fee and an emission
quotas regime:
1. No cooperation with free trade: obtained by iterative computation of optimal
responses by individual countries in environmental policies under free trade until
convergence to a non-cooperative equilibrium is reached;
2. Intra-regional cooperation in environmental policies with free trade: as for Sce-
nario 1 but assuming coordinated optimal response in environmental policies
by all countries in each region (optimal responses are computed by maximizing
joint welfare for all countries in a region);
3. Intra-regional cooperation in environmental policies in the North with free trade:
as for Scenario 2 but assuming coordinated optimal response in environmental
policies only in the North region;
4. Global cooperation in environmental policies with free trade: all countries in
each region adopt full-internalization emission taxes or quotas;
5. Nash bargaining over environmental policies with free trade and side payments
of cash;
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6. No cooperation with endogenous taris: obtained by iterative computation of
optimal responses by individual countries in trade and environmental policies
until convergence to a non-cooperative equilibrium is reached;
7. Intra-regional cooperation in environmental policies: as for Scenario 7 but as-
suming coordinated optimal response in environmental policies by all countries
in each region;
8. Intra-regional cooperation in environmental policies in North region only: as for
Scenario 8 but assuming coordinated optimal response in environmental policies
limited to the North region;
9. Global cooperation in environmental policies with endogenous taris: all coun-
tries adopt full-internalization emission taxes or quotas;
10. Nash bargaining over environmental policies with side payments of cash.
Simulation results are summarized in Tables 3 to 6. Tables 3 and 4 show re-
sults when taris are frozen at zero (free trade) under emission taxes and quotas
respectively. The non-cooperative outcome features under-internalization, suggesting
a weak direct linkage between carbon emissions and tradeables production. Also,
note that in the trade data intra-bloc trade ows dominate inter-bloc ows in terms
of their size, which, since countries are treated symmetrically within blocs, limits the
eects of asymmetries in incentives for net importers and net exporters of pollution
intensive goods. If the linkage between emissions and tradeables production were
suciently strong, and inter-bloc trade suciently large, the non-cooperative equi-
librium could feature over-internalization. Indeed, we have performed experiments
with our model (not shown) which conrm the possibility of such an occurrence; for
example, over-internalization occurs in the North region, when environmental poli-
cies are coordinated within regions, if we assume that emissions are only generated
in the tradeables sector, and if we increase the share of tradeables production which
is exported in the North by one-half and by a factor four in the South.
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Table 3: Non-cooperative and Cooperative Equilibria
with Emission Taxes and Zero Taris
Scenario
1 2 3 4 5
%
Internalization rate

North 6.66 72.39 73.53 100.00 100.00
South 0.75 29.80 0.82 100.00 100.00
Welfare change

A. Relative to Scenario 1
North 0.0 1.74 0.79 2.48 1.80
South 0.0 1.78 1.29 1.18 4.28
B. Relative to zero taxes
North 0.42 2.16 1.21 2.90 2.22
South 0.43 2.21 1.72 1.61 4.71

Ratio of emission tax to marginal emission damage

Ratio of equivalent variation to GDP
Scenarios:
1. No cooperation (free trade)
2. Intra-regional cooperation in environmental policies
3. As for Scenario 2 but with cooperation in the North only
4. Global cooperation in environmental policies
5. Bargaining with side payments with 1 as disagreement point
20
Table 4: Non-cooperative and Cooperative Equilibria
with Emission Quotas and Zero Taris
Scenario
1 2 3 4 5
%
Internalization rate

North 6.67 73.87 73.62 100.00 100.00
South 0.75 29.81 0.81 100.00 100.00
Welfare change

A. Relative to Scenario 1
North 0.0 1.74 0.79 2.48 1.80
South 0.0 1.79 1.29 1.18 4.28
B. Relative to zero taxes
North 0.42 2.16 1.21 2.90 2.22
South 0.43 2.22 1.72 1.61 4.71

Ratio of implicit emission tax to marginal emission damage

Ratio of equivalent variation to GDP
Scenarios:
1. No cooperation (free trade)
2. Intra-regional cooperation in environmental policies
3. As for Scenario 2 but with cooperation in the North only
4. Global cooperation in environmental policies
5. Bargaining with side payments with 1 as disagreement point
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As expected, internalization rates are higher under a quota regime, implying that
quotas are superior on eciency grounds. The dierence in internalization rates,
however, is only signicant when policies are coordinated within regions (second and
third columns of Tables 3 and 4), and even in this case it is not large enough to
generate a signicant dierence between the two instruments in terms of welfare.
Again, this is a reection of the weak linkages between trade and carbon emissions.
If taris are endogenous (Tables 5 and 6), non-cooperative equilibria feature lower
internalization rates than under free trade, regardless both of the policy instrument
used and of country size. This is because, when direct instruments of trade policy
are available, countries no longer need to use environmental policies as substitutes
for trade policies. In this case fee and quota based instruments are equivalent when
responses are fully uncoordinated (Scenario 6). But when environmental policies
are coordinated within regions, a quota regime leads to signicantly lower levels of
non-cooperative taris, and is clearly superior to an emission charge in terms of
welfare. Indeed, Tables 5 and 6 show that, for any form of environmental cooperation
(regional or global), the tari rates associated with a quota regime are lower than
those implied by an emission tax. As mentioned earlier, this is due to the fact that,
when countries must abide by agreed upon environmental policies, quotas make export
supply responses less elastic.
In contrast, emission charges raise producer prices, making export supply re-
sponses more elastic (with reference to a partial equilibrium diagram, this eect can
be thought of as an \upward shift" of supply curves); in turn, higher elasticities
result in increased trade barrier. This eect is particularly dramatic under global en-
vironmental cooperation (fourth and fth columns of Table 5), where non-cooperative
taris in the South region are in excess of 100%.
Whatever the regime, internalization rates are consistently higher in the North,
reecting its higher valuation for environmental quality; the tendency to free ride
is stronger for the South. Intra-bloc environmental cooperation signicantly raises
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Table 5: Non-cooperative and Cooperative Equilibria
with Emission Taxes and Endogenous Taris
Scenario
6 7 8 9 10
%
Internalization rate

North 2.95 61.46 63.38 100.00 100.00
South 0.25 29.07 0.27 100.00 100.00
Intra-regional taris
North 67.22 72.42 73.05 75.83 75.89
South 66.70 76.47 66.69 111.99 120.79
Inter-regional taris
North 67.05 72.73 72.74 76.16 75.45
South 66.71 76.44 66.69 112.35 120.80
Welfare change

A. Relative to Scenario 6
North 0.0 1.54 0.63 1.67 0.92
South 0.0 1.59 1.23 0.50 2.29
B. Relative to zero taxes and taris
North -2.12 -0.58 -1.49 -0.45 -1.20
South -1.49 0.10 -0.26 -0.99 0.80

Ratio of emission tax to marginal emission damage

Ratio of equivalent variation to GDP
Scenarios:
6. No cooperation
7. Intra-regional cooperation in environmental policies
8. As for Scenario 7 with cooperation in the North only
9. Global cooperation in environmental policies
10. Bargaining with side payments with 6 as disagreement point
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Table 6: Non-cooperative and Cooperative Equilibria
with Emission Quotas and Endogenous Taris
Scenario
6 7 8 9 10
%
Internalization rate

North 2.95 63.24 63.22 100.00 100.00
South 0.25 28.82 0.25 100.00 100.00
Intra-regional taris
North 67.30 67.30 67.30 67.23 67.49
South 66.69 66.71 40.69 65.80 66.70
Inter-regional taris
North 67.11 67.11 67.11 67.11 66.63
South 66.70 66.68 66.70 66.36 66.70
Welfare change

A. Relative to Scenario 6
North 0.0 1.84 0.85 2.44 1.57
South 0.0 1.90 1.37 1.27 3.75
B. Relative to zero taxes and taris
North -2.12 -0.28 -1.27 0.32 -0.55
South -1.50 0.40 -0.13 -0.23 2.25

Ratio of implicit emission tax to marginal emission damage

Ratio of equivalent variation to GDP
Scenarios:
6. No cooperation
7. Intra-regional cooperation in environmental policies
8. As for Scenario 7 with cooperation in the North only
9. Global cooperation in environmental policies
10. Bargaining with side payments with 6 as disagreement point
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internalization rates and welfare, especially in the North. With endogenous taris,
on the other hand, the North bloc experiences higher welfare losses than the South
under non-cooperation, a nding that is in line with the fact that OECD countries
trade more, especially among themselves.
Scenarios 3 and 8 correspond to a \Kyoto Protocol"-type arrangement, with com-
mitments to reduce emissions only undertaken by developed economies. Even when
environmental policy cooperation is limited to the North region, if countries do not
cooperate in trade policies, there is still a signicant dierence between taxes and
quotas, with both regions being better o if regional environmental cooperation is
supported by quotas rather than by emission taxes (Tables 5 and 6, third column).
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Compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium, global environmental cooperation
in the form of full internalization without side payments favours both regions but
especially the North bloc (Scenarios 4 and 9). Compared to the zero-tax/zero-tari
scenario, however, with endogenous taris this type of environmental cooperation
would still leave both regions worse o if an emission charge were used (Table 5,
Scenario 9); switching to a quota regime would make the North bloc better o, but
the South would still continue to lose (Table 6, Scenario 9).
In both regimes|emission charges and emission quotas|to induce full internaliza-
tion by the South, the North would have to compensate them. Scenario 10 examines
a global cooperation agreements supported as a Nash bargaining outcome through
side payments. This outcome is clearly more favourable to the South in comparison
with the no-side payments case; but the bargaining outcome is considerably more
7
Note, however, that under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol international emissions trading is allowed,
whereas in our model quotas are country-specic. Allowing for intra-bloc trading of emission quotas
would result in output responses being more price elastic in comparison with a country-specic quota
system, thus making quotas somewhat closer, in their implications for trade retaliation, to emission
taxes. Furthermore, although commitments under the Kyoto Protocol are specied in terms of
quantities, emission taxes may well be involved in its implementation.
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favourable to the South region (and less unfavourable to the North) if the environ-
mental treaty is supported by emission quotas rather than by emission taxes).
Our simulation results highlight the diculties associated with global environmen-
tal cooperation in the form of full internalization given the strong regional asymmetry
in terms of valuation of environmental quality. Global cooperation is obviously supe-
rior to no cooperation at all. However, in comparison with intra-regional cooperation,
global environmental cooperation would be attractive for the North but not for the
South; and the side payments required to make it appealing to the South would
make it unattractive to the North, independently of both the environmental policy
instrument used and whether or not taris are endogenously determined. A global
negotiated outcome would be even less attractive to the North if side payments, rather
than being based on bargaining, were based on a property rights principle, with rev-
enues from taxes, or, equivalently, rents from tradeable permits, being distributed
according to population: given our parameterization, the implied transfers from the
North to the South would be about one third larger than under Nash bargaining.
This seems to be consistent with the current de facto abandonment|under the 1997
Kyoto Protocol|of both the idea of the South adopting much more stringent envi-
ronmental policies and that of the North compensating them for it. Our results also
suggest that, with the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the North may have settled for an op-
tion clearly inferior for them to both intra-regional and global cooperation but which
would appear acceptable to the South's interests.
Our numerical ndings should be qualied by stressing the high degree of uncer-
tainty surrounding the parameter values used for calibration. Elasticity values, in
particular, are a crucial determinant of the level of non-cooperative trade barriers;
assuming lower (and possibly more realistic) trade elasticities would lead to consider-
ably higher barriers and trade-related eects. Also, given the large per-capita income
spread between the North and the South regions, a small change in the assumed value
of the income elasticity of environmental quality valuation can lead to a dramatically
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dierent imputation of abatement benets across regions.
We have explored the eects of these and other parameters through sensitivity
analysis (not shown). Although assuming dierent parameter values aects non-
cooperative policy levels, as well as the magnitude and distribution of welfare eects,
the qualitative pattern of the results remains the same, and underscores the same
general theme: in a strategic, open-economy setting, emission quotas are preferable
to emission taxes on eciency grounds, as they lead to higher rates of internalization
under free trade, or to lower trade barriers when trade policies are determined non-
cooperatively. Both regions, and particularly the South, could thus gain from a regime
switch from carbon charges to carbon quotas or permits.
6 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we have used a calibrated model of North-South trade with carbon
emissions to compare the implications of quantity and fee based environmental policy
instruments in a strategic, open-economy setting. We have computed both non-
cooperative Nash equilibria in trade and environmental policies as well as Nash co-
operative solutions where countries bargain over environmental policies.
Results of our numerical simulations show that, under free trade, dierent in-
struments of CO2 emissions reduction are not equivalent; specically, under free
trade, carbon quotas or permits can lead to higher levels of internalization in a non-
cooperative equilibrium in comparison with carbon taxes. The dierence, however, is
not very pronounced, a symptom of the fact that the direct linkage between carbon
emissions and tradeables production is rather weak. If taris are endogenized, carbon
quotas and carbon taxes lead to similar levels of internalization, but non-cooperative
taris are higher under a carbon tax regime. Thus, although in a full-information,
closed-economy setting carbon taxes and quotas or permits may be viewed as being
equivalent, when trade linkages and strategic trade responses are accounted for, emis-
27
sion quotas could be preferable as a means of supporting regional or global carbon
treaties both for the North and the South.
In light of these results, the endorsement of an emission permit regime by the 1997
Kyoto Protocol appears to be a good choice where trade cooperation is concerned,
although the stipulation in it of international tradeability for permits will make this
regime rather more similar to an emission tax regime. On the other hand, even though
both the North and the South stand to gain from the Kyoto agreement relatively to a
non-cooperative scenario, gains are likely to be substantially larger for the South, who
can free ride almost completely on the North's improved environmental management.
Yet, there still seems to be scope for further global gains to be had from expanded
participation under the U.N. Framework Convention; but, whatever the terms of such
an enlarged agreement, the use of quotas rather than taxes to support it should reduce
incentives for an aggressive trade policy stance, thereby aecting multilateral trade
negotiation outcomes.
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